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Bob began by emphasizing ("I love integration") his deep commitment to theoretical integration, reflected in his work with George Atwood since the early '70s when they studied the subjective origins of Personality theories, "the intellectual germ of intersubjectivity theory (IST)". They were distressed by the fragmentation of psychoanalytic personality theories into religiously held schools of thought with little communication or cross fertilization so that cumulative knowledge could not develop. To correct this Stolorow and Atwood believed that psychoanalysis should "circle back and reflect on its own foundations, particularly its own subjective foundations." Through their own series of psycho- biographical studies they demonstrated that: "metapsychological systems of personality theories and psychoanalysis can be seen, in part, as absolutizations and universalizations of the personal subjectivity of each theorist.
Because of these conclusions, that every psychoanalytic theory is to a significant degree, shaped by the personal subjectivity of the theorist and that every theory is particularized in scope and thus "fallible" (Orange), it was obvious that psychoanalysis needed a theory of subjectivity itself. "We needed a depth psychology of personal experience broad enough and inclusive enough to account [not only] for the phenomena that other theories address but also for the theories themselves as psychological products."
Bob recounted this history to emphasize that the Intersubjective Perspective (ISP) has been inherently integrative in its thrust from its very inception. He thus left no doubt about his belief that integration was indeed desirable. Turning to the question of whether integration is possible, he divided his response into two sub-questions:
1. Is integration possible in terms of the theoretical concepts proposed by the three points of view?
2. Is Integration possible from the stand points of the personalities involved and politics of the "self psychology movement".
He proposed the following answers:
1. Integration is definitely possible provided that one takes into account the different levels of abstraction, generality and inclusiveness at which these three frameworks exist. His own view is that, IST, which offers a broad theoretical vision of the organization of personal experience and its vicissitudes within constituting intersubjective fields, exists at a very high level of abstraction and generality. On the other hand, self-selfobject theory (SO), being primarily a clinical psychoanalytic theory which originated in the study of Narcissism and Narcissistic Pathology, is less abstract and inclusive. He reiterated his concern that, whenever he has made this point, and he has been doing so for about 7 years, some misconstrue his intellectual point and become upset. He emphasized that when he is saying that IST is more abstract than SO theory, he is not saying that it is better than SO theory and he is not saying that it should supersede SO theory. What he does mean is that, in his view, IST provides a more general scientific and philosophical outlook in which selfobject theory can find a comfortable home. He then quoted Donna Orange: "The ISP is not the kind of clinical theory that prescribes specific clinical interventions and techniques-it does not do that. Instead it is a broad intellectual sensibility through which virtually any psychoanalytic process from any clinical-theoretical point of view can be conceptualized."
Bob then turned to a difference of temperament which he felt contributed to his different attitude to the benefits in theory modification. Unlike Paul who believes that changes in theory are warranted only if clinically compelling, he feels that changes in theory are warranted if they are intellectually and aesthetically compelling. This is one of the reasons he is inclined to think about things in ever widening levels of abstraction and generality. He then returned to clarify and amplify this issue of different levels of abstraction and generality from another angle.
In contrast to every other psychoanalytic theory, IST does not postulate particular psychological contents that are presumed to be universally salient in personality development and pathogenesis. e.g. Freud's Oedipus complex, Mahler's separation-individuation, Klein's paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, Kohut's idealizing, mirroring and twinship longings etc. Each of these theorists have taken one to three important affective themes, absolutized and universalized them and proposed that "these are the bedrock for every person in development and pathogenesis". IST exists at a different level of abstraction and does not do that. It is not a "content" theory. It is, instead, a "process" theory, offering broad methodological and epistemological principles for investigating and comprehending the intersubjective contexts in which psychological phenomena, including psychoanalytic theories, arise. IST provides a framework for integrating different psychoanalytic theories by contextualizing them. Hence the various content themes of other theories, the Oedipus complex, the conflicts over separation/individuation, the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, the idealizing mirroring and twinship longings etc., can, according to the intersubjectivist point of view, be deabsolutized, deuniversalized and recognized as powerful metaphors that can become salient in the subjective worlds of some people under particular intersubjective circumstances. Bob went on to stress that, from this point of view, personal experience is fluid, multidimensional and exquisitely context sensitive. He and his colleagues describe multiple dimensions of experience, oscillating between the foreground and background, between figure and ground, within an ongoing system of reciprocal mutual influence.
Having established clearly the ISP, he went on to focus on the integration of the three approaches. Selfobject Theory (SOT) is seamlessly integrated into the IST viewpoint as a dimension of experience, a dimension of relatedness, and a dimension of transference. Far from being devalued, selfobject theory provides IST with some of its most important content, deabsolutized, deuniversalized and contextualized.
Motivational Systems Theory (MST), like IST, is more generalized and inclusive than SOT. Just as IST pictures multiple foreground-background relationships oscillating among multiple dimensions of experience, MST envisions shifting dominance hierarchies among motivational systems. For both IST and MST, selfobject needs represent one among several dimensions of personal experience and human motivation.
Bob then pointed to one primary difference between MST and IST: MST offers a universal typology of human motivation. i.e. there are 5 motivational systems operating in every human being, not 4, not 6, etc. To integrate MST with IST requires contextualizing the former. By this he meant that "the most useful way of slicing the motivational pie would be seen as a function of the unique Intersubjective Field (ISF) constituted by a particular patient with a particular therapist at a particular moment in time". For many treatment dyads, it might be most useful to picture 5 motivational systems, for others 4, others 6, others (joking) ?17--- it depends on the unique context sensitivity.
2. At this point Bob turned to his "second sub-question": Is integration possible given the personalities involved and the politics of the self psychology movement?
He believed that integration was possible "providing that all of us can begin to hold our theories "lightly" rather than "tightly" (Orange) and begin to engage in a truly secularized open polylogue, as was already happening at this conference.
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